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ABSTRACT
Biometric technology promises to reshape the modern
economy. With the increased prevalence of biometric technology
comes a heightened risk of data breaches and identity theft. To
protect consumers, state legislatures have enacted biometric
privacy laws. As more state legislatures define the intangible
harm of data misuse, some federal courts have restricted what
constitutes an injury sufficient to create Article III standing.
This analysis misapplies Spokeo and undermines legislative
efforts to protect individual privacy. Because of the important
interests at stake with biometric information privacy, federal
courts should follow the Ninth Circuit and recognize the misuse
of that data as a sufficient injury to constitute standing.
Consumers usually cannot opt out of new biometric technologies
implemented at airport gates, shopping centers, and workplaces.
The federal courts also should not use standing doctrines to opt
out of the intangible harms characterizing the information age.

INTRODUCTION
Your face is now your boarding pass.1 JetBlue used this slogan
to announce its first fully integrated self-boarding gate, which uses facial
recognition technology to verify travelers’ identities.2 This technology
operates in conjunction with a partnership with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection.3 To verify a traveler’s identity, the technology scans the
traveler’s face and checks the image against a database maintained by the
Department of Homeland Security.4 The database cross-references these
†
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images with photos from visa and passport applications, allowing
Customs and Border Patrol to record the passenger’s departure to
determine if they overstayed their visa.5 The Department of Homeland
Security aims to use facial recognition technology to identify 97 percent
of all departing air passengers within the next four years.6 It is unclear
how airline travelers can opt out of this collection method.7
Consumers likely cannot opt out of the coming biometric
technology revolution, either. Businesses already routinely use
fingerprints and facial recognition technology for surveillance,
marketing, timekeeping, and tracking customers.8 The market for
biometric technology is projected to reach nearly $52 billion by 2023.9
With the vast expansion of biometric technology comes an increased risk
of data breaches and identity theft. The risk of identity theft is
particularly dangerous for biometric identifiers,10 which are completely
unique to the individual.11 Once they are compromised, “the individual
has no recourse, is at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to
withdraw from biometric-facilitated transactions.”12

5

Emily Birnbaum, DHS Wants to Use Facial Recognition on 97 Percent of
Departing Air Passengers by 2023, THE HILL (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/439481-dhs-wants-to-use-facialrecognition-on-97-percent-of-departing-air.
6
Id.
7
See generally Jason Kelley, Skip the Surveillance by Opting Out of Face
Recognition at Airports, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/skip-surveillance-opting-out-facerecognition-airports.
8
See, e.g., Chad Brooks, The Biometric Time and Attendance System Laws You
Should Know, BUSINESS NEWS DAILY (June 10, 2019) (“Many of today's time
and attendance systems offer the options of recording employee time by
fingerprint, palm, iris or facial scan.”); Kiely Kuligowski, Facial Recognition
Advertising: The New Way to Target Ads at Consumers, BUSINESS NEWS DAILY
(July 18, 2019) (using facial recognition technology to change product displays
based on customers); Jennifer Lynch & Adam Schwartz, Victory! Illinois
Supreme Court Protects Biometric Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/01/victoryillinois-supreme-court-protects-biometric-privacy.
9
Chris Burt, Biometrics Market to Approach $52 billion by 2023 as Facial
Recognition and Banking AI Expand, BIOMETRICUPDATE.COM (Apr. 12, 2019),
https://www.biometricupdate.com/201904/biometrics-market-to-approach-52billion-by-2023-as-facial-recognition-and-banking-ai-expand.
10
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(c) (2008)
11
Id.
12
Id.

295

OPTING OUT: BIOMETRIC INFORMATION
PRIVACY AND STANDING

[Vol. 18

To protect consumers, states are considering laws regulating the
collection of biometric data.13 One of the earliest and strongest versions
of these statutes is the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act
(BIPA), which regulates “the collection, use, safeguarding, handling,
storage, retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers and
information.”14 The act requires companies to obtain affirmative consent
before collecting biometric information.15 To enforce these provisions,
the Act includes a private right of action.16 Lawsuits filed under this
private right of action will likely increase, especially after the Supreme
Court of Illinois reduced the threshold required to bring a suit under
BIPA.17 Some law firms have established practice groups devoted to
biometric privacy.18 As biometric technology becomes more prevalent
and more states pass statutes defining these rights, these trends will
continue to surge.19
The misuse of biometric information threatens individual privacy
rights. As facial recognition technology becomes ubiquitous and more
companies collect and disseminate biometric information, the stakes of
these injuries increase exponentially. In response to this growing threat,
state legislatures have passed statutes protecting biometric information
privacy. At the same time, the standing doctrine has restricted what
privacy violations constitute concrete harms sufficient for Article III
standing. This analysis misapplies Spokeo, allows federal judges to
substitute their judgment over the judgment of state legislatures, and
undermines the effectiveness of state legislative responses to growing
threats to individual privacy.
Section II of this Note provides
background on the standing doctrine and demonstrates how federal
courts have used Spokeo to restrict cognizable information privacy
harms. Section III details the state statutes protecting biometric
13
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information and the underlying interests at stake and proposes how
federal courts should analyze the harm caused by threats to biometric
information privacy.

ANALYSIS
I.

SPOKEO, STANDING, AND BIOMETRIC PRIVACY

Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of the
United States only to cases and controversies.20 To ensure that federal
courts remain within this limited grant of authority, the Supreme Court
developed the doctrine of standing.21 The doctrine of standing “limits
the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court
to seek redress for a legal wrong.”22
The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing requires
three elements.23 The plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact that
can be traced to the defendant’s actions and will likely be redressed by a
favorable decision.24 To establish an injury in fact, a plaintiff must show
that he suffered from “an invasion of a legally protected interest.”25 This
invasion must be concrete, particularized, and “actual or imminent.”26 It
cannot be based on a hypothetical injury.27 An injury is particularized if
it affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.28
The injury in fact must also be concrete.29 This requirement
helps to ensure that the court makes decisions based on “concrete, living
contest[s] between adversaries,” not abstract, intellectual hypotheticals.30

20

U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2.
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The injury must be real, not abstract.31 Intangible injuries, however, may
still be considered concrete for the purposes of standing analysis.32 In
determining whether an intangible harm qualifies for standing, courts
should take into account history and Congressional judgment.33 A court
is more likely to recognize an intangible harm closely related to a
traditional common law harm.34 The court should also consider
Congressional judgment “because Congress is well positioned to identify
intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements.”35
Congress can elevate injuries to the statute of legally cognizable concrete
injuries.36 This also applies to state legislative judgments.37
In some instances, the violation of a procedural right created by
statute is enough to constitute a concrete injury.38 For example, in
Federal Election Commission v. Akins, the inability to obtain information
that should have been publicly disclosed under the Federal Election
Campaign Act constituted an injury in fact.39 The federal statute
expressly authorized people to file a complaint to challenge violations of
the act.40 In light of this provision, the Supreme Court concluded that
Congress intended to authorize suits challenging these violations.41
Thus, the plaintiffs’ inability to obtain information about campaign
31

Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
Id. at 1549. (“‘Concrete’ is not, however, necessarily synonymous with
‘tangible.’”).
33
Id.
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historical practice, it is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible
harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as
providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”).
35
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37
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importance of federal congressional judgments and reasoning that “the same
must also be true of legal rights growing out of state law”) (quoting FMC Corp.
v. Boesky, 852 F.2d 981, 993 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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donors and contributions constituted a concrete and particular injury.42
Central to this inquiry was the importance of the interest at stake—
voting.43
The requirement of a concrete injury is not automatically
satisfied, however, whenever a statute provides a right and authorizes
someone to sue for the vindication of that right.44 In another
informational injury case, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Supreme Court
addressed whether the publication of inaccurate information in violation
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act constituted a concrete injury in fact.45
In Spokeo, the Supreme Court held that “Article III standing requires a
concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”46 The Court
noted that “Congress plainly sought to curb the dissemination of false
information by adopting procedures designed to decrease that risk.”47
Because the Ninth Circuit did not address whether the violations entailed
“a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement,”
however, the Court remanded the case.48
On remand, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the injuries
were sufficiently concrete for Article III standing.49 An earlier decision
from the Second Circuit interpreted Spokeo as instructing “that an
alleged procedural violation can by itself manifest concrete injury where
Congress conferred the procedural right to protect a plaintiff’s concrete
interests and where the procedural violation presents ‘a risk of real harm’
to that concrete interest.”50 The Ninth Circuit adopted this test in Spokeo
II, asking “(1) whether the statutory provisions at issue were established
to protect his concrete interests (as opposed to purely procedural rights),
and if so, (2) whether the specific procedural violations alleged in this
42

See id. at 1784 (“Given the language of the statute and the nature of injury, we
conclude that Congress, intending to protect voters such as respondents from
suffering the kind of injury at issue, intended to authorize this kind of suit.”).
43
See id. at 1786. (“The informational injury here, directly related to voting, the
most basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete. . . .”).
44
See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo I), 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548, as revised (May
24, 2016) (discussing the standard for establishing the concreteness and
particularization of an injury).
45
Id. at 1544.
46
Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1045 (2019) (quoting Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. at
1549).
47
Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. at 1550.
48
Id.
49
Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Spokeo II), 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 931, 200 L. Ed. 2d 204 (2018).
50
Strubel, 842 F.3d at 190 (quoting Spokeo I, 136 S. Ct. at 1549).
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case actually harm, or present a material risk of harm to, such
interests.”51
Applying this test, the Ninth Circuit found that Congress
established the Fair Credit Reporting Act to protect consumers’ concrete
interests.52 These interests include protecting consumers from the
transmission of inaccurate information and protecting consumer
privacy.53 Because of the “ubiquity and importance of consumer reports
in modern life,” false information in these reports can constitute a real
harm to consumers.54 Congress likely intended to protect against this
threat without showing additional injury, especially because a consumer
would likely have difficulty determining exactly who accessed the credit
report.55 The Ninth Circuit also analogized the interests protected by the
FRCA to other common law reputational and privacy interests, such as
defamation and libel.56 Because of these historical analogs and evidence
of Congress’s judgment to protect consumers, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the FRCA protected a concrete interest in accurate credit
reporting.57
To satisfy the second part of the test for when a procedural
violation constitutes a concrete injury, the violation must also cause real
harm or present a material risk of harm.58 Spokeo II tasked lower courts
with examining specific violations to determine whether they raise a real
risk of harm to the concrete injuries the statute protects.59 The Supreme
Court did not articulate exactly what qualified as real harm for inaccurate
information but explained that it must be something more than an
inaccurate zip code.60
The Ninth Circuit found the inaccurate
information disseminated about the plaintiff regarding his age,
educational background, and employment history were likely to harm his

51
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requirements may result in no harm”).
52
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material interests.61 Thus, the plaintiff alleged injuries sufficiently
concrete for Article III standing.62
Federal courts have used the test articulated in Spokeo to dismiss
a wide range of data privacy lawsuits,63 including cases alleging
violations of biometric privacy laws.64 In McGinnis v. U.S. Cold
Storage, the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Illinois held
that failure to provide statutorily required notice when collecting and
retaining the plaintiff’s fingerprint did not constitute a concrete injury
requisite for Article III standing.65 The plaintiff did not allege anything
more than a violation of the requirement in Biometric Information
Privacy Act of giving notice and obtaining consent before collecting his
fingerprint.66 He did not allege disclosure to a third party or a data
breach or even the risk of disclosure.67 He simply alleged that he was
required to scan his fingerprint for authentication as part of U.S. Cold
Storage’s time tracking system.68 The court concluded that mere anxiety
about indefinite retention of his biometric information was insufficient to
establish a concrete injury for standing.69
Courts have stringently applied the analysis in Spokeo to dismiss
cases for lack of standing in information privacy cases.70 Generally,
courts hesitate to recognize data-breach harms as an injury-in-fact for
Article III standing.71 This continues to be true with misuse of biometric
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standing); Braitberg v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir.
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64
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Ill. 2019).
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See Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV.
439, 455 (2017) (noting that “lower courts have continued to scrutinize the
harms claimed by plaintiffs and to reject at least some privacy harms as
insufficiently ‘concrete’ to support standing”).
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See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of
Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 785 (2018) (“Looking across the
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information privacy. As state legislatures continue expanding what
constitutes biometric information harms, the federal courts are
counteracting these efforts by restricting the harms that qualify as
sufficiently concrete injuries.72 In Spokeo, the Supreme Court suggested
that lower courts look to history and Congressional judgment in
determining whether injuries are sufficiently concrete.73 Because Spokeo
provided little guidance on what harms represent a real and material risk,
however, lower courts have relied on their own judgment to determine
what harms are sufficient.74 This allows them to substitute their
judgment for that of the state legislators and undermines the
effectiveness of new biometric information privacy laws.75

II.

PROTECTING BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY

As biometric technology becomes more ubiquitous, state
legislatures are seeking solutions to protect biometric information
privacy. Some states are modeling these statutes after the Illinois’
Biometric Privacy Act, which was passed in 2008. The Biometric
Information Privacy Act regulates “the collection, use, safeguarding,
handling, storage, retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers and
information.”76 A biometric identifier includes “a retina or iris scan,
fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.”77 Biometric
information encompasses any information “based on an individual’s
biometric identifier used to identify an individual.”78 Significantly, the
Biometric Information Privacy Act requires companies to obtain
affirmative consent from consumers before obtaining biometric data.79

body of jurisprudence of data-breach harms, it is fair to say that courts are
reluctant to recognize data-breach harms.”).
72
Wu, supra note 70, at 455.
73
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo I), 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550, as revised (May 24,
2016).
74
See Wu, supra note 70, at 455−57 (“[L]ower courts have continued to
scrutinize the harms claimed by plaintiffs and to reject at least some privacy
harms as insufficiently ‘concrete’ to support standing.”).
75
See Wu, supra note 70, at 456 (“Such a judgment about what ‘counts’ as a
privacy violation is precisely the sort of judgment that the Supreme Court's preSpokeo cases avoided but that the Spokeo decision invites.”).
76
740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/5(g) (2008).
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740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/10 (2008).
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740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/15(d)(1).
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The Act also created a right of action for parties to recover from entities
that violated the regulations on handling biometric data.80
The Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the Act in Rosenbach v.
Six Flags Entertainment Corporation.81 The court explained that the Act
gives individuals the right to control their biometric information.82 The
procedural protections are important because “technology now permits
the wholesale collection and storage of an individual’s unique biometric
identifiers – identifiers that cannot be changed if compromised or
misused.”83 A company’s failure to obtain consent before collecting
biometric data constitutes an independent harm.84 The right of the
individual to control his or her “biometric privacy vanishes into thin air,”
and the harm is complete at the moment of the violation.85
The court explained that the procedural protection in the
Biometric Information Privacy Act is not a mere technicality.86 It is the
statute’s primary precautionary measure to protect biometric privacy.87
Biometric technology is still in its infancy, and businesses do not have
mechanisms to remedy these data breaches.88 The legislature intended
that the Act deter businesses from allowing biometric data breaches.89
Furthermore, the only enforcement mechanism for this Act is the private
right of action.90 The court explained that requiring individuals “to wait
until they have sustained some compensable injury beyond violation of
their statutory rights before they may seek recourse . . . would be
completely antithetical to the Act’s preventative and deterrent
purposes.”91 Thus, the court concluded that a plaintiff does not need to
allege injury beyond the violation of the rights protected by the
Biometric Information Privacy Act.92

80

740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/20.
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm't Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1201–02, (Ill. 2019).
82
Id.
83
Id. (quoting Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948, 954 (N.D. Cal.
2018)).
84
Id.
85
Id. (quoting Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948, 954 (N.D. Cal.
2018)).
86
Id. at *7.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at *8.
81
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Rosenbach was decided about a month after the federal district
court came to the opposite conclusion in McGinnis. Applying Spokeo,
violations of the notice-and-consent provisions of the Biometric
Information Privacy Act should “by itself manifest concrete injury.”93
The state legislature conferred a procedural right to protect consumer’s
concrete interests, and the violation of that procedural right presents a
risk of real harm to that interest.94 Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme
Court reiterated that the violation of this procedural right constituted an
independent harm to the consumer’s ability to control his or her
biometric information privacy.95 This harm goes far beyond the
hypothetical incorrect zip code the Supreme Court mentioned in Spokeo.
Zip codes can be altered. Biometric information cannot. Once biometric
information is misused, a consumer has no recourse. The violation of
this intangible harm constitutes an injury in fact.
How federal courts will interpret the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act in light of Rosenbach remains unclear. After
Rosenbach, the Seventh Circuit upheld standing for an alleged violation
of the Biometric Information Privacy Act in Miller v. Southwest
Airlines.96 In Miller, plaintiffs alleged that the airlines use of fingerprints
for timekeeping purposes violated the Biometric Information Privacy
Act.97 The potential impact on the workers’ terms and conditions of
employment gave the case a concrete injury not present in Spokeo.98 The
Seventh Circuit has not yet decided a case with similar facts as
Rosenbach.99 In past decisions not involving the Biometric Information
Privacy Act, the Seventh Circuit has held that retaining personal
information did not constitute a concrete injury.100
How federal courts respond to future standing challenges
involving biometric information privacy will determine the effectiveness
of state legislative attempts to protect biometric information. Federal
93

See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Spokeo II), 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir.
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 931 (2018).
94
Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 190 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo I), 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1559, as revised (May 24, 2016)).
95
Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1197, 1201–02.
96
Miller v. Sw. Airlines Co., 926 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2019).
97
Id. at 901.
98
Id. at 902.
99
The court may have an opportunity to hear a case with similar facts with the
appeal from Rivera v. Google, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 998 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
(dismissing for lack of standing).
100
Rivera, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 1005 (citing Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.,
846 F.3d 909, 912–13 (7th Cir. 2017)).
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judges may have concerns about the impending flood of litigation
accompanying these statutes or whether the notice-and-consent
provisions are appropriate remedies for violations of biometric
information privacy. They should not use standing doctrines, however,
to supersede the judgments of state legislatures.101 The rapid proliferation
of facial recognition technology requires a quick, informed response by
state legislatures. Allowing courts to scrutinize which privacy harms are
cognizable and which are not “undermines the legislature’s ability to act
to prevent harms proactively.”102 For now, private enforcement is the
primacy mechanism to prevent violations of biometric information
privacy.103 Denying relief by characterizing a privacy harm as the wrong
kind of harm impedes this enforcement mechanism.104
Rather than deepening the split between federal and state courts
and between the federal circuits, federal courts should follow the lead of
the Ninth Circuit. In Patel v. Facebook, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Facebook’s collection of the plaintiffs’ face templates constituted a
concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing.105 The court explained
that the right protected by the Biometric Information Privacy Act was the
right to not be subject to the collection of biometric data.106 Thus,
Facebook’s violation of the procedural requirements under BIPA
violated the plaintiffs’ substantive privacy interests.107
Quoting
Rosenbach, the court explained that “when a private entity fails to adhere
to the statutory procedures . . . the right of the individual to maintain his

101

See Wu, supra note 70, at 458 (“When courts deny standing in these cases on
the basis of the injuries being insufficiently concrete, they are not deciding
whether the cases are ones that concern individual rights, but rather deciding the
substantive content of those rights. Far from supporting an appropriate
separation of powers, this move amounts to a usurpation of legislative power by
the federal judiciary.”).
102
See id. at 459 (“Moreover, scrutiny of harms undermines the legislature's
ability to act to prevent harms proactively, rather than only addressing
completed harms.”).
103
See id. at 460 (“Denying standing on the basis of the harm being the wrong
kind of harm essentially takes private lawsuits in federal courts out of the picture
entirely. While the possibility of purely executive or administrative action would
remain, such a rule can severely hamper the government's ability to regulate the
challenged activity by removing an important tool from the regulatory
toolbox.”).
104
Id. at 460.
105
Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1275 (9th Cir. 2019).
106
Id. at 1274.
107
Id.
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or her biometric privacy vanishes into thin air.”108 To prevent
protections of biometric privacy from vanishing, federal courts should
recognize the substantive rights of privacy protected by statutes like the
Biometric Information Privacy Act.

CONCLUSION
Biometric technology promises to reshape modern commerce,
transportation, law enforcement, and more. The greatest injuries will
likely be intangible and based on ephemeral interests in information
privacy.109 As state legislatures attempt to define these intangible harms,
the federal courts should not use standing to opt out of providing
remedies.

108

Id. (quoting Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm't Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1201–02
(Ill. 2019)).
109
See Seth F. Kreimer, "Spooky Action at A Distance": Intangible Injury in
Fact in the Information Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2016).

